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Keywords: Heterogeneity, Sunspots.
JEL codes: E21, E25, E62
Daniel R. Carroll is in the Research Department at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland. Contact him at Daniel.Carroll@clev.frb.org. Eric R. Young is in the 
Department of Economics at the University of Virginia. Contact him at ey2d@
virginia.edu.   Both authors thank the Bankard Fund for Political Economy at the 
University of Virginia for ﬁ  nancial support. Parts of this project were completed 
while Eric R. Young was visiting the Minneapolis Fed, and their hospitality is 
gratefully acknowledged. 1. Introduction
Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Farmer and Guo (1994) show that a homogeneous-agent business
cycle model with socially-increasing returns to scale can have steady states that are sinks; since
transversality can no longer be invoked to uniquely determine current consumption, the model
has a continuum of equilibrium paths. Furthermore, random iid variables can generate business
cycles – called sunspots, animal spirits, or self-fulﬁlling expectations by various authors – as agents
coordinate their consumption decisions on these fundamentally-irrelevant variables. Econometric
evidence can be found that supports a wide range of increasing returns, from very small (Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 1995, Bartelsman 1995, Basu and Fernald 1995) to very large (Hall 1990,
1991, Bartelsman, Caballero, and Lyons 1994); none support the degree needed for the basic model
to display indeterminacy, however. Our objective in this paper is to consider the presence of
sunspots in models of heterogeneous agents.
We ﬁnd that heterogeneity in wealth reduces the required degree of increasing returns to scale
needed for sunspots to appear, while heterogeneity in wages increases it. In a simple two agent
economy we are able to reduce the required increasing returns to scale to 0.275 by setting wealth
inequality near its upper bound while setting wage inequality to its lower bound. While this
parametrization is not reasonable empirically (permanent wage inequality is signiﬁcant in US data,
as shown in Flod´ en and Lind´ e 2001), it does work in the ”right” direction since the distribution
of wealth in the US is much more unequal than the distribution of wages; of course, the required
returns to scale is still too large. When we carefully calibrate the model to the US distribution of
wealth, income, and hours – following the approach in Carroll (2009) – we ﬁnd that it requires a
higher degree of increasing returns to scale, but not as large as the models of Benhabib and Farmer
(1994) or Farmer and Guo (1994) do. The introduction of other features that have been shown
to reduce the required increasing returns to scale – such as home production, multiple sectors, or
elastic capacity utilization – may very well push the model into plausible ranges.
We also explore the number of additional stable eigenvalues that appear. In particular, we want
to know whether the eigenvalues ”move en masse” across the unit circle or somewhat independently
– that is, can the model produce only one sunspot, many sunspots, or does it have to have the same
number of sunspots as predetermined wealth levels? We ﬁnd that the model robustly produces
only one sunspot variable, despite having 1242 diﬀerent capital stocks. That is, while each agent
can have a shock to their Euler equation, n−1 of the shocks must be linear functions of the shock
1that hits the nth individual (Benhabib and Nishimura 1998 show a similar result in a model with
multiple sectors and irreversible investment). In other words, the model can be parameterized to
match any volatility for individual consumption, since the scale factors are not pinned down (this
result is similar to the homogeneous agent case where the volatility of the sunspot is arbitrary and
frequently calibrated to match the volatility of output). Furthermore, the sunspot disappears when
the degree of increasing returns to scale gets too large, a phenomenon not observed in homogeneous
agent economies.
In summary, we see our contribution here as pointing out the ability of heterogeneity to inﬂu-
ence the dimension of the stable dynamics of the growth model with increasing returns to scale.
There are two related contributions that we want to reference here. Herrendorf, Valentinyi, and
Waldmann (2000) use the model from Matsuyama (1991) to study the eﬀects of heterogeneity for
multiplicity, concluding that heterogeneous agent models make the empirical importance of multi-
plicity more untenable. However, Ghiglino and Olszak-Duquenne (2005) note that the direction of
the eﬀect is actually ambiguous in the model of Matsuyama (1991) – heterogeneity could reduce or
increase the required returns to scale. The Matsuyama (1991) model is substantially diﬀerent than
the standard growth model – it contains overlapping generations of households with geometric life
who must make an irreversible occupational choice at birth, for example – so our work constitutes
an independent contribution.
2. Model













where βi ∈ (0,1) and Bi > 0 are heterogeneous preference parameters. σ−1 ≥ 0 is the common
intertemporal elasticity of substitution for leisure. The budget constraint is
(1 + τc)ci,t+ai,t+1 ≤ (1 + rt − δ)ai,t+wtεihi,t−τ ((rt − δ)ai,t + wtεihi,t)−χt ((rt − δ)ai,t + wtεihi,t)+Tt;
(2.2)
ci,t is consumption, ai,t are shares of the production technology, εi is the permanent productivity
level for hours hi,t. rt −δ is the return on shares, and wt is the aggregate wage index. τ (y) is the
2income tax function from Gouveia and Strauss (1994):









This functional form is ﬂexible enough to capture a wide range of tax functions; we assume that
the parameters (ν0,ν1,ν2) are such that the tax schedule is marginal-rate progressive (the marginal
tax rate is an increasing function of income) because this setting is the empirically-relevant one.1
Tt is a lump-sum transfer, τc is a constant consumption tax, and χt is an additional ﬂat tax on
income.
The production ﬁrm rents capital and labor and generates net output. The production tech-














is the productive externality and K and N are the economy-wide values for capital and labor input.


















where ψi is the measure of type i (consisting of a triple (εi,βi,Bi) for each i). The parameter
υ ≥ 0 measures the strength of the externality; since (1 + υ)α + (1 − α)(1 + υ) ≥ 1, the model
features increasing returns to scale at the aggregate level whenever υ > 0. We restrict attention
to the case α(1 + υ) < 1, so that the economy does not display unbounded growth.
1Consistency with balanced-growth requires ν2 to grow at rate g
−ν1
y , where gy is the growth rate of income. As
it plays no important role in the presence of indeterminate equilibria, we ignore growth here.
3The government collects taxes to ﬁnance government consumption according to the budget
constraint
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We assume that transfers and government spending are constant over time, so that χ adjusts to clear
the government budget constraint. As noted in Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (1997), this assumption
typically leads to indeterminacy at smaller returns to scale, so we are biasing our investigation in
favor of ﬁnding sunspots.
3. Two Agent Economy
The full model is diﬃcult to analyze due to its immense size, so we develop intuition using a simpler
model with two agents and no ﬁscal policy; as a result, the wealth distribution is indeterminate
and we can discuss how inequality aﬀects indeterminacy by exogenously varying the fraction of
assets held by each type of household. This economy has only one predetermined variable: the
aggregate capital stock. Indeterminacy then arises whenever the number of eigenvalues smaller
than 1 in absolute value exceeds 1. As a preview of the results, wealth inequality makes it more
likely that sunspots occur while wage inequality makes it less likely (in the sense that the critical
value of υ is lower or higher).
Consider the economy above but with only two agents, no taxes, and homogeneous preferences.
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C1t = (rt + 1 − δ)A1t + wtε1H1t − A1t+1
C2t = (rt + 1 − δ)A2t + wtε2H2t − A2t+1
Kt = ψA1t + (1 − ψ)A2t
Nt = ψε1H1t + (1 − ψ)ε2H2t.
The distribution of assets is not determined by the economy, so we specify it exogenously. We set
ε1 = µ and ε2 = 1 and then set A1t = ηKt and A2t = (1 − η)Kt for each t.2 We use this simple
system to illustrate how the presence of sunspots depends on wage heterogeneity µ and wealth
heterogeneity η. We set ψ = 0.5, although the results we obtain are not sensitive to this number.
When linearized around the unique interior steady state, the fundamental diﬀerence equation
takes the form
AEt [Xt+1|Ft] = BXt (3.1)
where A and B are 10 × 10 matrices. We calibrate the parameters {δ,β,B} to match a capital-
output ratio of 11.5, an investment-output ratio of 25 percent, and total hours equal to 33 percent of
the time endowment. We set σ = 0.5, since it is known that sunspot equilibria require highly elastic
labor supply, and set α = 0.36 in line with estimates of capital’s share of income.3 Indeterminacy
arises when the number of generalized eigenvalues of the matrix pencil |A − Bz| that lie within the
unit circle is larger than 1.4
2Setting ε2 = 1 is an innocuous normalization that serves only to choose units of steady state output.
3The system (3.1) contains a unitary eigenvalue due to the indeterminacy of the steady-state wealth distribution.
The full model will not have this feature because progressive taxation is suﬃcient to deliver determinate wealth
distributions – see Carroll and Young (2009).
4It is possible that the number of eigenvalues inside the unit circle is actually 0, implying that the steady state
is locally a source. However, it also may be surrounded by stable cycles, as in Coury and Wen (2008). We discuss
such issues in the conclusion.
5For each value of (η,µ) we calculate the critical value of υ that induces indeterminacy. As
shown in Figure (1), increasing µ increases the required increasing returns to scale while increasing
η tends to decrease this value. What is interesting to note is that the required increasing returns
to scale can be small if wealth inequality is extreme and wage inequality is moderate. We also
point out that the model parametrization µ = 1 and η = 0.5 is equivalent to a homogeneous
agent economy. In this case, our model requires that υ exceed 0.5 in order for sunspot equilibria
to appear, consistent with results in Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Farmer and Guo (1994).
These results suggest that one route to indeterminacy may be through heterogeneity; given that
the US distribution has extreme wealth inequality (Budr´ ıa et al. 2002 compute a Gini coeﬃcient
of 0.8) and more moderate wage inequality (Gini coeﬃcient of earnings is 0.6 and hours are highly
uniform across individuals who work), it seems that sunspot equilibria may not be implausible. To
examine this possibility more carefully the next section presents an economy that matches these
distributions by construction.
Before moving on to the full model, however, we want to provide some intuition about how
wealth and wage inequality work to produce indeterminacy. As noted in Benhabib and Farmer










subject to the budget constraint
c = a + wh,
where a is total nonhuman wealth and w is the after-tax wage. The optimal tradeoﬀ between
consumption and leisure implies the condition
(a + wh)
−1 w = B (1 − h)
−σ .




1 − wh(a + wh)
−1
σw(1 − h)
−1 + w2 (a + wh)
−1;
note that the response of hours is decreasing in σ, so small values of σ imply large labor supply
6elasticities. Larger a implies that hours become more responsive to changes in wages:
d2h
dwda
= (1 + h(σ − 1))
1 − h
(σ(a + wh) + w(1 − h))
2 > 0
since 1 > h(1 − σ) holds for any σ ≥ 0 and any h < 1. Furthermore, large w means that hours





σ (a + 2wh) + 2w(1 − h)
(σ(a + wh) + w(1 − h))
2 < 0.
Thus, an economy where wealth is concentrated in the hands of the highly productive will feature
larger movements in aggregate labor input; the economy computed here satisﬁes this requirement
and so displays indeterminacy at relatively-low increasing returns to scale.5 In US data, there is
a positive correlation between wages and ﬁnancial wealth, but whether this correlation is strong
enough to signiﬁcantly reduce the required returns to scale is a quantitative issue. We now turn
to examining this question.
4. The Full Model
We now present and calibrate our full model. As noted in Carroll and Young (2009), without
preference heterogeneity the distribution of income and wealth in a complete market model is
fundamentally inconsistent with the data in the presence of progressive taxation. We therefore
calibrate our model by using data to infer characteristics that would equate the model’s steady state
to empirical observations. Speciﬁcally, the deterministic steady state is used to obtain estimates
for the individual parameters (βi,εi,Bi) using the formulae
βi =
1
1 + (1 − τ′ (yi) − χ)(r − δ)
εi =
yi − (r − δ)ai
whi
Bi =






(1 − χ)yi + T − τ (yi)
1 + τc
5Jaimovich (2008) also notes the importance of the wealth eﬀect on labor supply, although within the context of
a representative agent model.
7is steady-state consumption.6 We ignore agents with zero hours, since their presence would not
aﬀect the near-steady-state dynamics. We also discard from the sample any households whose
reported income yi is smaller than their reported wealth ai times the model interest rate r−δ, since
those households would have negative productivity values. To simplify computation of the near-
steady-state dynamics, we combine households into a smaller number of types and normalize units
so that steady state income is 1, steady state average hours are 0.33 of the total time endowment,
and steady state wealth is 3; types that have mass less than 10−5 are discarded.7 Figures (2)- (4)
display the cumulative distribution functions from the SCF data and the approximated distribution
functions. Only the distribution of wealth deviates signiﬁcantly from that found in the data, and
even this ﬁt is not unreasonable given the simplicity of the model.8
We calibrate the other parameters to match some targets in US data. We choose δ to match
an investment-output ratio of 15 percent and G to match a government spending-output ratio of 20
percent. The tax parameters are ν0 = 0.268 and ν1 = 0.768, with ν2 set to clear the government
budget constraint. We set χ = 0.1 and T to generate transfers equal to 10 percent of output and
to imply that progressive taxes account for 68 percent of government revenue. We set α = 0.36
to match capital’s share of income and set τc = 0.05. We set σ = 0.5, so that labor supply is
highly elastic. A steady state can be computed then as the solution to three equations in three
unknowns: aggregate capital K, aggregate labor input N, and the tax parameter ν2.
Denote by n the number of household types that survive elimination and the eigenvalues of
the linear system by λ; #{|λ| < 1} represents the number of eigenvalues with modulus less than
1. The model is saddle-stable if #{|λ| < 1} = n and indeterminate if #{|λ| < 1} > n.9 If
#{|λ| < 1} = 2n the economy has a sink-stable steady state, as all combinations of capital stocks
and consumption choices converge to the steady state; otherwise we will refer to the indeterminate
case as a nonunique saddle since the combinations of capital and consumption that converge to the
steady state has lower dimension than the system as a whole. Although in principle n could vary
with υ since r is endogenous, we ﬁnd that the number of household types is constant at 1242.
Table 1 summarizes the results from varying υ (with recalibration for each value). We ﬁnd
6These equations are simply the steady state conditions for optimality at the individual level, inverted to solve
for parameters instead of quantities.
7See Appendix A.
8In particular, we note that rich households in the data earn above-average returns on their portfolios due to the
presence of stocks.
9n is equal to the number of predetermined variables, namely ait. Unlike the model in the previous section, the
determinacy of the steady state wealth distribution eliminates the unitary eigenvalue.
8that the critical level of υ is smaller in our heterogeneous-agent economy than in similar economies
studied by Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Farmer and Guo (1994), despite the fact that we use a
smaller labor supply elasticity (those papers use σ = 0) – we note again that the minimum required
returns needed for our model to display indeterminacy when agents are homogeneous is above 0.5,
as in those papers.10 However, because the wage distribution is also relatively concentrated, the
full model still requires large increasing returns to generate indeterminacy. In the homogeneous
agent economy of Benhabib and Farmer (1994), a necessary condition for indeterminacy is that the
labor demand curve slopes upward and crosses the labor supply curve from below; this condition is
satisﬁed if σ < (1 − α)(1 + η), meaning that the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply must be
suﬃciently high. In our model, what matters is roughly the elasticity of output with respect to
aggregate labor input, not labor supply – that is, one must weight each agent’s labor supply curve
by their eﬃciency unit before summing. And the full model implies that aggregate labor input
behaves quite similarly to aggregate labor hours because the correlation between wealth and wages
is not suﬃciently strong. We conclude that a calibrated model of income and wealth heterogeneity
is unlikely to make sunspot equilibria more plausible.11
The other thing to note about Table 1 is that the number of sunspots is at most 1. When the
economy passes into the indeterminacy region, it robustly predicts only one expectational variable
can aﬀect the equilibrium. In terms of dynamics, this result implies that the stable dynamics
unfold on an n + 1-dimensional manifold where the exact path is chosen by the single sunspot
realization. Of course, with heterogeneous agents the assumption that all agents coordinate on a
single random variable to pin down their expectations strains credulity; however, if they do this
random variable must be unidimensional.12 As in Benhabib and Nishimura (1998), one should
interpret the model as having each agent individual’s Euler equation perturbed by a sunspot shock
that is perfectly correlated with every other sunspot; thus, the model does not pin down the
volatility of any individual’s consumption. Furthermore, unlike Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and
Farmer and Guo (1994), the sunspot disappears when increasing returns get too large. It seems
10We do not use σ = 0 because it implies a labor supply indivisibility (see Rogerson 1988). With heterogeneous
agents, indivisible labor supply generates corner solutions for almost every household (see Maliar and Maliar 2004);
for our economy with a discrete number of types, the aggregate labor supply elasticity would then be zero.
11The business cycle dynamics of our calibrated heterogeneous agent model are very similar to the representative
agent version. We defer a complete study of those dynamics as they would substantially lengthen the paper without
adding any signiﬁcant contribution.
12Heterogeneous expectations in the complete market model typically lead to degeneracy of the wealth distribution,
as formally they are equivalent to diﬀerences in discount factors (see Carroll and Young 2009 for an explicit deﬁnition
of degeneracy). Since heterogeneous sunspots would be diﬃcult to reconcile with complete markets, we do not pursue
this direction.
9likely that the steady state is surrounded by stable cycles – global sunspots – even when the local
results indicate saddle-stability, however, and we make some comments in the conclusion about this
issue.
5. Conclusion
We have shown that heterogeneity is a potential route to indeterminacy – a complete market model
with wage and wealth inequality displays indeterminate equilibria at lower levels of social increasing
returns to scale than do homogeneous agent models. A large-scale model designed to ﬁt the US
distribution of income, wealth, and hours worked shows a reduction in the required level of returns
to scale relative to the homogeneous agent model of Farmer and Guo (1994), but it is still quite
high relative to numbers the data would support. Other researchers have added elements to the
basic model that reduce these required increasing returns, such as capacity utilization (Wen 1998),
multiple production sectors (Benhabib and Farmer 1996), and home production (Perli 1998). One
extension of this note would be to introduce these ingredients into the heterogeneous agent model;
since our purpose is not to ﬁnd a model that generates sunspots with quantitatively-reasonable
parameter values we do not pursue these extensions.
A more challenging extension would be to investigate the global dynamics of the heterogeneous-
agent model. Guo and Lansing (2002) and Coury and Wen (2009) show that the growth model with
increasing returns to scale can display complicated global dynamics even when the equilibrium is
locally determinate. Those models are limited in their potential to deliver exotic dynamics by their
low dimension; in contrast, the full heterogeneous-agent model that we use could deliver a large
range of wildly-complicated dynamics that are simply not possible in low-dimensional systems. In
particular, Guo and Lansing (2002) caution against using policy prescriptions derived from linear
approximations, as they can generate global indeterminacy in the form of limit cycles and chaos.
We hope to explore these issues in future work; our work would be complementary to Dromel and
Pintus (2008), who study a stylized model of workers and capitalists and show that progressive
taxation can rule out local but not global indeterminacy. Solving for the global dynamics of our
model will be computationally-intensive, however, and so we do not pursue it further here.
Finally, we note the extensive literature that rejects complete markets using individual con-
sumption data.13 Extending our investigation to models of incomplete insurance markets would
13This literature is so extensive and well-known we refrain from choosing one contribution to cite.
10be technically diﬃcult (since incomplete markets introduce unit roots into the evolution of asset
holdings) but would provide a more natural setting for coordination failures; when agents do not co-
ordinate on a single aggregate variable, heterogeneous beliefs arise and markets become eﬀectively
incomplete (see Graham and Wright 2007). It is known that incomplete markets can generate
cycles and bubbles when they would be impossible under complete markets (see Kocherlakota
1992,1996), so moving to such settings may indeed make expectational equilibria more empirically
tenable. We leave this investigation for future work.
A. Appendix
The calibration exercise backs out preferences (βi,Bi) and labor productivity εi from household level
data on income, wealth, and hours by using the steady state Euler equations and the deﬁnition of
income in the model. In this way, one may calibrate (βi,Bi) and εi so that the long-run distribution
from the model closely matches the data. There are 15,961 households in the pooled SCF data
(we deﬂate each year by the GDP deﬂator for 1992 to express all variables in real terms). We then
coarsen the distribution to reduce the number of types by pooling types that are similar enough.
The following steps are used to calibrate the steady state (for additional detail see Carroll 2009).
1. Fix a range of income and wealth values over which to place grid points and partition the
income, wealth, and hours intervals into (ny,nk,nh) segments, respectively. While it is
permissible to make these grid points evenly spaced, because of the skewness of the data we
ﬁnd that a better approximation can be achieved by bunching more grid points at the lower
ends of the interval for income and wealth. We use grid points generated according to the
rule








where c and d are constants and n is the number of grid points. For income we set c = −2
and d = 0.5, and for wealth we set c = −0.8 and d = 5. We use 20 grid points for income




(xy,xk,xh) : [aj ≤ xy < aj+1] ∪ [bm ≤ xk < bm+1] ∪ [cn ≤ xh < cn+1],




where (a,b,c) are the grid points for income, wealth, and hours, respectively. Sum the
11population weights for observations that lie within the cube and assign this measure to the
center point (yj,km,hn). The collection of all such center points is the support for the joint
distribution.
2. Normalize the type weights so that
 nynknh
i=1 ψi = 1. Because some income/wealth/hours
combinations do not appear in the data, if ψi < 1.0 ∗ 10−5 set ψi = 0. Let the number of
types with non-zero weight be nt ≤ nynknh. Normalize (A,B,C) such that
 ny
i=1 ψiyi = 1,
 nk
i=1 ψiki = 11.5, and
 nh
i=1 ψihi = 0.33.
3. Because wealth in the data may be composed of many types of assets each yielding a diﬀerent
return, while the model has only one asset, it is possible for some wealth levels in the data to
imply negative income at r. These observations are removed. The total number of remaining
types after consolidation of small measure types and dropping of negative income types is
1262.






i=1, solve for (βi,εi,ci,Bi):
βi = [(1 − τy (yi) − χ)(r − δ) + 1]
−1
εi =
yi − (r − δ)ki
whi
ci =
yi − τ (yi) + T
1 + τc
Bi =
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